The fifteenth annual rally commemorating the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, in Tel Aviv’s Rabin Square, will evidently be the last. The Rabin Institute announced that in light of falling attendance the annual assembly will be discontinued. Instead, his death will be commemorated by a state ceremony at his gravesite on Mt. Herzl in Jerusalem and various local events around the country–like the deaths of other distinguished departed. Thus, in the public mind, the life and death of Yitzhak Rabin recede into history.
Certainly, Israeli understanding of his political legacy is different now from what it was on that horrible night in 1995. Many of the young people who spontaneously mourned the assassinated prime minister, lighting candles and spending days and nights in small groups at Rabin Square, are now in their thirties. Hardly any Israeli today still shares Rabin’s public evaluation (evidently coupled with private doubts) that Yasser Arafat was a man with whom peace could be made. Few conceal their skepticism about the premise underlying Rabin’s peace efforts: that if we Israelis do the right thing, the Palestinians will do the right thing, and finally peace will prevail.
Some point to the decline in overt public mourning and the drift away from Rabin’s assumptions about peace as evidence that his legacy is somehow eroded. Yet in evaluating the man it is important to contextualize our sober view of the Oslo process within the broad context of his half-century of public service. His building up of Israel’s forces as Chief of Staff of the IDF, his part in the victory of 1967 and his legendary term as Israel’s ambassador to the U.S. are well known. What is less broadly acknowledged is his unique intellectual contribution to the security thinking of Israel. From his early years as a colonel in the newly formed IDF until the day he died (holding the portfolio of Defense Minister as well as Premier), he played a central role in shaping the underlying defense concepts that continue to guide Israeli security.
Second only to Ben-Gurion, he was an architect of close ties with the United States. At the same time, unlike America’s NATO allies, he stressed Israel’s responsibility to fight its battles without the aid of American troops.
A pillar of Rabin’s defense philosophy was his sophisticated understanding of the relationship between the pursuit of peace and preparation for war. Unlike some of Israel’s other leaders, such as Ariel Sharon, Rabin never fell for the delusion that “we are a great power.” Indeed, Rabin estimated that Israel would never have sufficient military power to impose a peace accord, the classic role of a military victor. Based on that assumption, he posited deterrence and self-defense, not conquest or elimination of the enemy, as the IDF’s goals. In a revealing 1991 speech he said: “I considered the prevention of war as the test of our security policy, in addition to being able to rapidly and forcefully end any war forced upon us.” The link between his concept of the IDF’s role, his pursuit of negotiated peace and his pro-Americanism lay in the understanding that an Israel that aggressively pursues peace can win on all counts, for even if peace is delayed, an Israel perceived as wanting peace will stand closer to the United States, and will therefore find it easier to deter a war or to win it.
One point on which he was mistaken was his sense that Israelis were not as tough as they used to be. He expressed himself to this effect following the First Gulf War. Fifteen years and an Intifada after his death, we can say with some confidence that Rabin underestimated the sheer grit of his fellow Israelis. Be that as it may, his bedrock ideas continue to shape the security debate. It is thanks to the towering intellect, military sagacity and unmatched leadership abilities of Yitzhak Rabin that Israelis debate a challenge rooted in his strategic thinking: is the Israeli government, whichever party heads it, doing all it can to pursue peace, so as to be better positioned to deter war or win it? Fifteen years after his death, Rabin’s legacy still guides us. As the traditional Jewish phrase puts it: “May his memory be blessed.”
First published at http://bit.ly/Tn7Rs0
The Rabin Assassination, Fifteen Years Later
The fifteenth annual rally commemorating the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, in Tel Aviv’s Rabin Square, will evidently be the last. The Rabin Institute announced that in light of falling attendance the annual assembly will be discontinued. Instead, his death will be commemorated by a state ceremony at his gravesite on Mt. Herzl in Jerusalem and various local events around the country–like the deaths of other distinguished departed. Thus, in the public mind, the life and death of Yitzhak Rabin recede into history.
Certainly, Israeli understanding of his political legacy is different now from what it was on that horrible night in 1995. Many of the young people who spontaneously mourned the assassinated prime minister, lighting candles and spending days and nights in small groups at Rabin Square, are now in their thirties. Hardly any Israeli today still shares Rabin’s public evaluation (evidently coupled with private doubts) that Yasser Arafat was a man with whom peace could be made. Few conceal their skepticism about the premise underlying Rabin’s peace efforts: that if we Israelis do the right thing, the Palestinians will do the right thing, and finally peace will prevail.
Some point to the decline in overt public mourning and the drift away from Rabin’s assumptions about peace as evidence that his legacy is somehow eroded. Yet in evaluating the man it is important to contextualize our sober view of the Oslo process within the broad context of his half-century of public service. His building up of Israel’s forces as Chief of Staff of the IDF, his part in the victory of 1967 and his legendary term as Israel’s ambassador to the U.S. are well known. What is less broadly acknowledged is his unique intellectual contribution to the security thinking of Israel. From his early years as a colonel in the newly formed IDF until the day he died (holding the portfolio of Defense Minister as well as Premier), he played a central role in shaping the underlying defense concepts that continue to guide Israeli security.
Second only to Ben-Gurion, he was an architect of close ties with the United States. At the same time, unlike America’s NATO allies, he stressed Israel’s responsibility to fight its battles without the aid of American troops.
A pillar of Rabin’s defense philosophy was his sophisticated understanding of the relationship between the pursuit of peace and preparation for war. Unlike some of Israel’s other leaders, such as Ariel Sharon, Rabin never fell for the delusion that “we are a great power.” Indeed, Rabin estimated that Israel would never have sufficient military power to impose a peace accord, the classic role of a military victor. Based on that assumption, he posited deterrence and self-defense, not conquest or elimination of the enemy, as the IDF’s goals. In a revealing 1991 speech he said: “I considered the prevention of war as the test of our security policy, in addition to being able to rapidly and forcefully end any war forced upon us.” The link between his concept of the IDF’s role, his pursuit of negotiated peace and his pro-Americanism lay in the understanding that an Israel that aggressively pursues peace can win on all counts, for even if peace is delayed, an Israel perceived as wanting peace will stand closer to the United States, and will therefore find it easier to deter a war or to win it.
One point on which he was mistaken was his sense that Israelis were not as tough as they used to be. He expressed himself to this effect following the First Gulf War. Fifteen years and an Intifada after his death, we can say with some confidence that Rabin underestimated the sheer grit of his fellow Israelis. Be that as it may, his bedrock ideas continue to shape the security debate. It is thanks to the towering intellect, military sagacity and unmatched leadership abilities of Yitzhak Rabin that Israelis debate a challenge rooted in his strategic thinking: is the Israeli government, whichever party heads it, doing all it can to pursue peace, so as to be better positioned to deter war or win it? Fifteen years after his death, Rabin’s legacy still guides us. As the traditional Jewish phrase puts it: “May his memory be blessed.”
First published at http://bit.ly/Tn7Rs0
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Edward Rettig