On January 12, George Baghdadi reported on CBS News: “Syria on Tuesday summoned the highest-ranking American diplomat in Damascus and protested Washington’s ‘unfriendly procedures’ on Syrians wishing to travel to the States, warning it would take reciprocal measures if the move was not annulled.” Think of the apocryphal murderer who kills his parents and asks the court for mercy because he is an orphan. Syria is home to Hamas headquarters and, with Iran, cosponsors Hezbollah. Baghdadi’s story, beyond its chutzpah, has much to teach us about how the Syrian government keeps its grip on power.
Syria is in many ways an enigma to Western observers. Ethnicity lies at the heart of Syrian politics. Like Iraq, it has improbable borders that were determined by colonial powers, and these throw different ethnic/religious groups into a permanently tense political environment. About 70% of Syrians are Sunni Muslims, 3% Druze, and 10% Christians. Only about 100 remain of an ancient Jewish community that numbered about 30,000 in 1948. Yet Syria’s politics have been dominated for decades by another religious-ethnic minority, the Alawites, 10% of the population. They claim to practice a form of Islam historically derived from Shi’ism, but their very identity as Muslims is often called into question by their political rivals. A regime dominated by Alawites is inherently built on a narrow base.
Economically, Syria calls to mind Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. Its overlarge public sector is run by a generally underqualified but politically reliable management class. Its private sector is small and its financial markets underdeveloped. Its extraction of natural resources is in decline, particularly oil. High levels of corruption undermine economic efficiency and hold back development. The population (including refugees) was growing at an unmanageable annual rate of 3.47% in 2008, while economic growth in 2009 stood at only 2.2%. The Ba’ath regime has been in power in one form or another since 1963.
One might think that Syria is a prime candidate for pragmatic, democratic, reforms, but what would be good for Syria is not necessarily good for the regime. The potentially savage consequences of defeat for the Alawite elite motivate brutal, and so far successful, suppression of opposition. Thus the regime seems not only to survive but flourish, despite its failures. It has largely overcome its conflict with Turkey; its relationship with Iran is as strong as ever; and it has returned to dominate Lebanon. Internally, it is hard to identify any serious threats at this time.
A combination of three successful strategies guides the regime. As noted, the first is ruthlessness. The most efficient organizations in the country are the secret police agencies. Notoriously, the regime suppressed a Sunni led “intifada” in 1982, killing between 10,000 and 35,000 people.
Second, Syria strikes a macho pose protecting Arab Muslim honor, proclaiming resistance to the West and willingness to fight to the last martyr, a pose that is particularly useful given the persistent questions of the religious legitimacy of the Alawites. The alliance with Islamist Iran serves to bolster this image as well. Syria, in fact, has engaged in no direct military action against Israel since the early 1980s, so that fighting to the last martyr has come to mean to its last Lebanese puppet or foreign volunteer sent to Iraq.
Third, as noted above, the regime uses the resources of the state to buy quiet. Food subsidies, high by WTO standards, keep a restive population calm. The regime exploits the public sector to provide patronage and suborn the disenfranchised Sunni elite, while actual power remains in the hands of the Alawite leadership.
The regime maintains its position by playing these three strategies as occasion demands. Hence the calculated effrontery reflected in Baghdadi’s report, demanding America’s respect for Syria’s “honor” as if it were not up to its ears in its very “macho” support for terror.
Thus it is hard to see what interest the regime has in arriving at peace with Israel. It may, however, want to appear to negotiate, thus tempting the West even while striking a heroic pose before the Arab world. Actual peace with Israel could be very good for Syria, but given the circumstances of the Alawite elite, loss of an external enemy could be dangerous for the health of the regime.
The chances of seeing diplomatic activity on the Israel/Syria front are good, but the chances of arriving at a peace accord are not. Syria is quite likely to generate and then wreck a peace process. What is virtually certain is that it will act in its perceived interests with the same bloody ruthlessness that so far has served it well.
first published at http://bit.ly/1iFlYVs
Syria Sitting Pretty
On January 12, George Baghdadi reported on CBS News: “Syria on Tuesday summoned the highest-ranking American diplomat in Damascus and protested Washington’s ‘unfriendly procedures’ on Syrians wishing to travel to the States, warning it would take reciprocal measures if the move was not annulled.” Think of the apocryphal murderer who kills his parents and asks the court for mercy because he is an orphan. Syria is home to Hamas headquarters and, with Iran, cosponsors Hezbollah. Baghdadi’s story, beyond its chutzpah, has much to teach us about how the Syrian government keeps its grip on power.
Syria is in many ways an enigma to Western observers. Ethnicity lies at the heart of Syrian politics. Like Iraq, it has improbable borders that were determined by colonial powers, and these throw different ethnic/religious groups into a permanently tense political environment. About 70% of Syrians are Sunni Muslims, 3% Druze, and 10% Christians. Only about 100 remain of an ancient Jewish community that numbered about 30,000 in 1948. Yet Syria’s politics have been dominated for decades by another religious-ethnic minority, the Alawites, 10% of the population. They claim to practice a form of Islam historically derived from Shi’ism, but their very identity as Muslims is often called into question by their political rivals. A regime dominated by Alawites is inherently built on a narrow base.
Economically, Syria calls to mind Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. Its overlarge public sector is run by a generally underqualified but politically reliable management class. Its private sector is small and its financial markets underdeveloped. Its extraction of natural resources is in decline, particularly oil. High levels of corruption undermine economic efficiency and hold back development. The population (including refugees) was growing at an unmanageable annual rate of 3.47% in 2008, while economic growth in 2009 stood at only 2.2%. The Ba’ath regime has been in power in one form or another since 1963.
One might think that Syria is a prime candidate for pragmatic, democratic, reforms, but what would be good for Syria is not necessarily good for the regime. The potentially savage consequences of defeat for the Alawite elite motivate brutal, and so far successful, suppression of opposition. Thus the regime seems not only to survive but flourish, despite its failures. It has largely overcome its conflict with Turkey; its relationship with Iran is as strong as ever; and it has returned to dominate Lebanon. Internally, it is hard to identify any serious threats at this time.
A combination of three successful strategies guides the regime. As noted, the first is ruthlessness. The most efficient organizations in the country are the secret police agencies. Notoriously, the regime suppressed a Sunni led “intifada” in 1982, killing between 10,000 and 35,000 people.
Second, Syria strikes a macho pose protecting Arab Muslim honor, proclaiming resistance to the West and willingness to fight to the last martyr, a pose that is particularly useful given the persistent questions of the religious legitimacy of the Alawites. The alliance with Islamist Iran serves to bolster this image as well. Syria, in fact, has engaged in no direct military action against Israel since the early 1980s, so that fighting to the last martyr has come to mean to its last Lebanese puppet or foreign volunteer sent to Iraq.
Third, as noted above, the regime uses the resources of the state to buy quiet. Food subsidies, high by WTO standards, keep a restive population calm. The regime exploits the public sector to provide patronage and suborn the disenfranchised Sunni elite, while actual power remains in the hands of the Alawite leadership.
The regime maintains its position by playing these three strategies as occasion demands. Hence the calculated effrontery reflected in Baghdadi’s report, demanding America’s respect for Syria’s “honor” as if it were not up to its ears in its very “macho” support for terror.
Thus it is hard to see what interest the regime has in arriving at peace with Israel. It may, however, want to appear to negotiate, thus tempting the West even while striking a heroic pose before the Arab world. Actual peace with Israel could be very good for Syria, but given the circumstances of the Alawite elite, loss of an external enemy could be dangerous for the health of the regime.
The chances of seeing diplomatic activity on the Israel/Syria front are good, but the chances of arriving at a peace accord are not. Syria is quite likely to generate and then wreck a peace process. What is virtually certain is that it will act in its perceived interests with the same bloody ruthlessness that so far has served it well.
first published at http://bit.ly/1iFlYVs
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Edward Rettig