Largely obscured by the Carmel forest fire, two related developments last week call to mind the sad old epigram: in the Middle East, an optimist thinks things could be worse, while a pessimist knows they will be.
The United States announced it will no longer push for a further Israeli 90-day building freeze. At about the same time, the governments of Brazil and Argentina announced recognition of a Palestinian state within the “1967 borders,” with Uruguay announcing it will do so in early 2011. By the time you read this, other countries may have joined in.
Contrast the quiet acknowledgement of failure by the U.S. government with the loud way it originally raised the settlement issue as a precondition for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The conceptual flaws in this policy were widely noted and criticized at the time (including in this column). Many predicted that this precondition would strengthen the settler right in Israel, encourage Palestinian obstinacy, and confuse America’s supporters while delighting its critics. Now, despite the considerable achievement of getting Prime Minster Netanyahu to agree on an unprecedented ten-month building freeze, the initiative has arrived at its predicted demise.
Some observers believe that the Netanyahu government defeated the Americans. But this seriously misunderstands Israel’s security dilemma. Faced with an American policy widely regarded as fundamentally misguided, Israel walks a tightrope. On the one hand, it seeks to get that policy changed. On the other, Israel knows that no country in the world is as closely aligned with it as the United States and as closely committed to its success. Conversely, no country is as vulnerable as Israel if the U.S. is perceived as indecisive or incapable in the international arena. That is why Israeli spokespersons are portraying the dropping of the settlement-freeze requirement as a courageous American step toward the future, a result of close discussion between Americans and Israelis, and, improbably, a move that enhances U.S. standing in the region.
The recognition of a Palestinian state, begun by Brazil and followed by Argentina, suggests one result of the perception of American failure. The fruitlessness of the American track creates the appearance of a power vacuum that tempts up-and coming would-be world powers to get into the ring and see if they can succeed where the clumsy giant failed. From the standpoint of Brazilian or Argentinean interests, it is hard to see a downside. After all, these countries recognized a fictitious Palestinian state in 1988, with no harm done. If this second attempt brings results, each will have a significant and prestigious feather in its cap. If it brings no results, nothing is lost.
Yet it can be a damaging maneuver if taken seriously. The poorly formulated announcements by these governments—seemingly prepared for their effect as press releases—ride roughshod over international law and the legal foundations of the peace process. They provide incentive for the Palestinians to continue their stubborn refusal to offer concessions on any of the critical issues in the negotiations. The determination that the Palestinian state shall be in “the 1967 borders” ludicrously transfers the Western Wall to Palestinian rule and brings Palestinian territory within 11 kilometers of downtown Tel Aviv, with no security guaranties. All of this further confirms for many Israelis and their supporters that the international community is a kangaroo court where Israel’s legitimate concerns for safety, not to mention solemn commitments made to her, can be routinely ignored.
The Palestinians may have encouraged the South American recognition process as a way to gain actual statehood, but this is unlikely to succeed directly. Some observers therefore believe that the plan is to promote statehood indirectly by gaining standing before the International Criminal Court. Theoretically the ICC only has jurisdiction in countries that recognize its authority by signing on to the Rome Statute. In January 2009 the Palestinian Justice Minister, Ali Khashan, sent ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo a letter purportedly recognizing the ICC’s authority over the PA. On the face of it aimed equally at Hamas and Israel, Khashan’s letter would appear to open Gaza to ICC jurisdiction, a goal possibly furthered as more nations recognize Palestinian statehood. (Ironically, those who call on Israel for a settlement freeze in order to preserve the status quo feel no compulsion to urge the Palestinians to maintain the status quo by withdrawing their petition to the ICC).
Yet the process raises problems and even some dangers for the Fatah-led PA. First, the Oslo Accords that established the PA seem to preclude it taking a step like this. If so, can Ocampo even consider it? Second, there are many groups around the world who, like the Palestinians, have some attributes of statehood. Can they achieve statehood unilaterally by acquiescing in the Rome Statute and having the prosecutor declare their newborn status? We may think of the Kurds, the Quebecois, or the Basques. Was that kind of potentially destabilizing power placed in the hands of the ICC prosecutor by the Statute of Rome? Third, if indeed the ICC decides the PA is a state and has sufficient sovereignty in Gaza to recognize ICC jurisdiction there, this finding appears to undercut the legal and political claim that the Israeli occupation of Gaza has not ended. And fourth, ICC jurisdiction should apply not only to crimes allegedly committed by Israelis or by Hamas: certainly, many in Fatah will be looking over their shoulders for years to come. In short, Khashan’s letter, coupled with the Palestinian initiative to gain a second round of recognition of their theoretical state put both Israel and Palestine in a position to lose, no matter how Ocampo decides.
The timing of Brazilian and Argentinean recognition, alongside U.S. acknowledgement of its failure, shows how readily the international system can descend into disorder and dysfunction in the absence of strong U.S. leadership. Israel, of course, is threatened far more than the United States by this state of affairs, which is why Israeli spokespersons were so eager to deflect the perception of American failure. Whether that perception can be altered will largely hinge on U.S. action in the coming weeks and months.
First published at http://bit.ly/1yDKzii
Not With a Bang but a Dangerous Whimper
Largely obscured by the Carmel forest fire, two related developments last week call to mind the sad old epigram: in the Middle East, an optimist thinks things could be worse, while a pessimist knows they will be.
The United States announced it will no longer push for a further Israeli 90-day building freeze. At about the same time, the governments of Brazil and Argentina announced recognition of a Palestinian state within the “1967 borders,” with Uruguay announcing it will do so in early 2011. By the time you read this, other countries may have joined in.
Contrast the quiet acknowledgement of failure by the U.S. government with the loud way it originally raised the settlement issue as a precondition for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The conceptual flaws in this policy were widely noted and criticized at the time (including in this column). Many predicted that this precondition would strengthen the settler right in Israel, encourage Palestinian obstinacy, and confuse America’s supporters while delighting its critics. Now, despite the considerable achievement of getting Prime Minster Netanyahu to agree on an unprecedented ten-month building freeze, the initiative has arrived at its predicted demise.
Some observers believe that the Netanyahu government defeated the Americans. But this seriously misunderstands Israel’s security dilemma. Faced with an American policy widely regarded as fundamentally misguided, Israel walks a tightrope. On the one hand, it seeks to get that policy changed. On the other, Israel knows that no country in the world is as closely aligned with it as the United States and as closely committed to its success. Conversely, no country is as vulnerable as Israel if the U.S. is perceived as indecisive or incapable in the international arena. That is why Israeli spokespersons are portraying the dropping of the settlement-freeze requirement as a courageous American step toward the future, a result of close discussion between Americans and Israelis, and, improbably, a move that enhances U.S. standing in the region.
The recognition of a Palestinian state, begun by Brazil and followed by Argentina, suggests one result of the perception of American failure. The fruitlessness of the American track creates the appearance of a power vacuum that tempts up-and coming would-be world powers to get into the ring and see if they can succeed where the clumsy giant failed. From the standpoint of Brazilian or Argentinean interests, it is hard to see a downside. After all, these countries recognized a fictitious Palestinian state in 1988, with no harm done. If this second attempt brings results, each will have a significant and prestigious feather in its cap. If it brings no results, nothing is lost.
Yet it can be a damaging maneuver if taken seriously. The poorly formulated announcements by these governments—seemingly prepared for their effect as press releases—ride roughshod over international law and the legal foundations of the peace process. They provide incentive for the Palestinians to continue their stubborn refusal to offer concessions on any of the critical issues in the negotiations. The determination that the Palestinian state shall be in “the 1967 borders” ludicrously transfers the Western Wall to Palestinian rule and brings Palestinian territory within 11 kilometers of downtown Tel Aviv, with no security guaranties. All of this further confirms for many Israelis and their supporters that the international community is a kangaroo court where Israel’s legitimate concerns for safety, not to mention solemn commitments made to her, can be routinely ignored.
The Palestinians may have encouraged the South American recognition process as a way to gain actual statehood, but this is unlikely to succeed directly. Some observers therefore believe that the plan is to promote statehood indirectly by gaining standing before the International Criminal Court. Theoretically the ICC only has jurisdiction in countries that recognize its authority by signing on to the Rome Statute. In January 2009 the Palestinian Justice Minister, Ali Khashan, sent ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo a letter purportedly recognizing the ICC’s authority over the PA. On the face of it aimed equally at Hamas and Israel, Khashan’s letter would appear to open Gaza to ICC jurisdiction, a goal possibly furthered as more nations recognize Palestinian statehood. (Ironically, those who call on Israel for a settlement freeze in order to preserve the status quo feel no compulsion to urge the Palestinians to maintain the status quo by withdrawing their petition to the ICC).
Yet the process raises problems and even some dangers for the Fatah-led PA. First, the Oslo Accords that established the PA seem to preclude it taking a step like this. If so, can Ocampo even consider it? Second, there are many groups around the world who, like the Palestinians, have some attributes of statehood. Can they achieve statehood unilaterally by acquiescing in the Rome Statute and having the prosecutor declare their newborn status? We may think of the Kurds, the Quebecois, or the Basques. Was that kind of potentially destabilizing power placed in the hands of the ICC prosecutor by the Statute of Rome? Third, if indeed the ICC decides the PA is a state and has sufficient sovereignty in Gaza to recognize ICC jurisdiction there, this finding appears to undercut the legal and political claim that the Israeli occupation of Gaza has not ended. And fourth, ICC jurisdiction should apply not only to crimes allegedly committed by Israelis or by Hamas: certainly, many in Fatah will be looking over their shoulders for years to come. In short, Khashan’s letter, coupled with the Palestinian initiative to gain a second round of recognition of their theoretical state put both Israel and Palestine in a position to lose, no matter how Ocampo decides.
The timing of Brazilian and Argentinean recognition, alongside U.S. acknowledgement of its failure, shows how readily the international system can descend into disorder and dysfunction in the absence of strong U.S. leadership. Israel, of course, is threatened far more than the United States by this state of affairs, which is why Israeli spokespersons were so eager to deflect the perception of American failure. Whether that perception can be altered will largely hinge on U.S. action in the coming weeks and months.
First published at http://bit.ly/1yDKzii
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About Author
Edward Rettig