A New Mediterranean Constellation

Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent trip to Greece, reciprocating the visit of Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou to Israel last month, should have caused some rethinking in Ankara. Even if we take at face value the Israeli and Greek assertions that the meetings were not directed against Turkey, closer strategic cooperation between Israel and Greece will necessarily constrain that country’s room for maneuver. Perhaps some in Ankara will recognize that the visit—the first exchange between Israel and Greece at the Prime Ministerial level—is to some degree the result of Turkish policy.

Indeed, a broader pattern is emerging: the tightening of relationships between Greece, Cyprus and Israel, and, to a lesser degree, Egypt. To be sure, this is not an alliance, but something less—perhaps “constellation” is the most accurate designation, and it may take different shapes depending on how the regional architecture of power develops over the next few years. 

It certainly does not look like a natural formation. Only two of the countries, Cyprus and Greece, have deep cultural affinity. Historically, the four have not enjoyed particularly close relations, notwithstanding the affinities between Jews and Greeks of which both premiers made much in their public statements. For many years Greece favored its connections with the Arab world, first in the vain hope of preserving Greek Orthodox communities in those countries. and when these were gone, out of considerations of realpolitik. Athens only moved to full recognition of Israel in 1990. Israel, for its part, preferred its close ties with Turkey, and so relations with Greece remained low-profile. Israel and Egypt have a peace treaty but little mutual warmth. 

However, all four countries – each for its own reasons – have a deep need for regional stability. Israel and Cyprus are parties to longstanding, unresolved conflicts, and live daily with their destructive potential. Egypt desperately needs peace and quiet to get through the approaching unavoidable crisis of transition to a new president. Greece is dealing with profound economic problems and will benefit from stronger ties with the dynamic Israeli economy and the ability to tap into newly discovered Israeli and Cypriot natural-gas resources. Greece has much to lose from an Aegean neighbor pursuing a destabilizing foreign policy, and despite its NATO and EU memberships, will welcome another local anchor for its security.

In short, whatever their divergent paths over the years, three factors now combine to call this constellation into being. All four countries share a neighborhood, and as we noted, they also share a great need to avoid instability if they are to address their most pressing challenges. Third, they share a perspective that current Turkish policy is a destabilizing influence in the region. 

From the beginning, the Erdogan government struggled with its image. Is AKP a democratic party that draws on conservative religious values, an Islam-based version of a typical European “Christian Democratic” party? Or are its ties to radical Islam more problematic? It was in this context that the support offered by Turkey to the Hamas-led Muslim Brother mini-state in Gaza was widely seen as a revealing overreach. 

Indeed, the Turkish flotilla incident, which seemed to extend a Turkish sphere of influence to the very borders of Egypt, was merely the latest in a series of provocative steps by Ankara. Ironically, where a less mercurial Turkish leadership might have successfully expanded Turkish influence and been welcomed as a stabilizing factor in the region, the Erdogan government’s intemperate language and radical sympathies created its own aura of volatility and intimidation. 

This contributed to a growing perception that few of Turkey’s recent strategic bets are paying off. The emerging Eastern Mediterranean “constellation” is in significant measure a Turkish creation, taking its place alongside other missteps: strains in relations with Washington after a provocative vote against new UN Security Council sanctions on Iran; a degree of cooperation with Syria that appears to include the facilitation of arms transfers to Hezbollah; a growing sense in European capitals that Ankara’s new eastward focus complicates the prospect of EU membership; outreach to Armenia that raised Azerbaijani anxieties but did not prevent Yerevan from renewing for twenty years its lease to Russia of an airbase that some perceive as a potential threat to Turkey. 

A Turkish Foreign Ministry working group is currently in Washington where one expects they will engage in discussions on Turkey’s current predicament. Ankara finds itself on increasingly fraught terms with erstwhile good friends while cultivating its less savory neighbors. Perhaps their Washington hosts may pose the question to their Turkish colleagues: Is this foreign policy working well for Turkey? The new constellation in the Mediterranean would indicate not.

First published at http://bit.ly/1qEfb0F