Iran Sanctions, ICBMs, and Challenge in the EU

JERUSALEM – Three recent events demonstrate heightened challenges to the European Union: President Obama’s declaration that sanctions against Iran will be tightened “within weeks”; Iran’s unveiling of the newly developed Simorgh missile, a “satellite launch vehicle” that experts say can be turned into an ICBM; and President Obama’s decision not to attend the EU-U.S. summit scheduled for Madrid in May. 

On Obama’s effort to tighten Iran sanctions, BBC’s Mark Mardell noted: “The U.S. has gone it alone, trying to put the squeeze on the Revolutionary Guards, and there’s no sign so far of anyone else joining in.” The Americans want a UN Security Council resolution by the end of March. To be sure, Britain, Germany and France are engaged with the U.S. in discussions. France, the current president of the Security Council, is pressing for a tough resolution. Meanwhile, China’s resistance to sanctions poses a formidable obstacle to Council action; Russia has indicated it may drop its opposition, but this may be nothing more than a tactical move aimed at positioning itself to water down Security Council resolutions, as in the past. In other words, although plans for new UN sanctions are underway, Mardell is essentially correct so far. 

If the EU so chooses, hesitation in the world body may present an opportunity, since the Europeans need not wait for the UN. America’s current sanctions against Iran are broader than Europe’s, while the scale of EU-Iran trade is much larger. If the EU were to bring its own sanctions in line with America’s, the results would be quite painful for the Iranians; indeed, there has been talk in Brussels of EU sanctions that would follow, and exceed, whatever passes in the UN. But this sequence could be reversed. Europe, with its much greater trade, energy dependence, and closer proximity, has more to lose than the U.S. from the potential consequences of the failure of weak sanctions to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions – including a possible Iran-Israel confrontation. 

It is in this context that Israel’s mounting concerns should be understood. Missing from most EU rhetoric – at least in public – about the Iranian nuclear menace and an appropriate international response has been any insistence on the assurance of a credible threat of military force should sanctions fail. Statements from EU power centers in recent weeks have suggested increased focus on the Iranian issue – but without the apparent urgency that now rivets Israeli policy planners, and which the strategic establishment regards as essential. With many observers convinced that a likely sanctions scenario offers uncertain prospects of halting Tehran’s nuclear drive, harder options may quickly have to be considered; the failure of the EU policy establishment in general to publicly acknowledge this grim fact raises Israeli anxieties.

As for the new Iranian missile, Jerusalem Post’s Yaakov Katz observed that while its current iteration is apparently liquid-fueled, Iran possesses solid-fuel technology. Adapting the Simorgh to solid fuel could create a new class of Iranian ICBM – readily hidden and deployed. Coupled with a nuclear warhead, Simorgh could substantially raise the threat level to all of Europe—and beyond.

And finally, after President Obama announced he is not coming to Madrid in May, editorials in European newspapers complained that the American Administration “ignores Europe.” But they also grumbled of post-Lisbon-Treaty internal EU politics and sympathized with Obama, who must navigate between three quarrelling EU “presidents.” The answer to Henry Kissinger’s question, “If I want to call Europe, whom do I call?” remains elusive.

These three developments—uncertainty over the next round of sanctions; Iran’s appetite for more advanced weaponry; and possible EU-U.S. dissonance—reflect a deep conceptual challenge. EU representatives often speak of the Union, a remarkable post-War success story in many respects, as a soft-power superpower. But the current crisis over Iran suggests that projecting soft power depends on the capacity to project—or at least associate one’s interests with—some degree of hard power. Human nature being what it is, the hard-power potential to apply force does a lot to encourage people to pay attention to one’s soft-power ideas. 

The sooner sanctions succeed, the better for the EU. But can sanctions succeed—unless they are far more comprehensive than any that the UN and Brussels are likely to adopt? And should Iran continue its aggressive, heedless pursuit of nuclear capability after new sanctions are applied, will the EU have the tools and the decision-making process to react? With its post-Lisbon-Treaty hydra-headed structure, the answer is unclear. 

Obama’s decision to skip Madrid may be matter of simple scheduling overload—or a sign of diminished expectations from EU-U.S. partnership. But the challenges to Europe are plain, and troubling. And unless they are faced boldly, it may be that for Israel’s European friends, being a low priority for a busy American president may be the least of its worries.

first published at http://bit.ly/1lp6KDF