Discussing an “Obama Peace Plan”

Some observers close to the Israeli government are expressing concern over reports of a meeting of former U.S. national security advisors with President Obama at which there was said to have been discussion of a new peace process strategy if Israeli-Palestinian negotiations—still blocked by Ramallah—fail to produce results. 

Although the Administration has subsequently and repeatedly denied the intention to present an “Obama peace plan,” the story has excited discussion both in Israel and among those who follow Middle East developments elsewhere. The purported plan—perhaps a single peace proposal building on previous Israeli-Palestinian talks, or a series of suggestions American mediators could put forward when the two sides again face each other across a bargaining table—would not be “imposed” in a take-it-or-leave-it sense, but would carry considerable moral and political weight. 

The following points, highlighted in conversations with a number of knowledgeable Israelis, will require consideration if such a hypothetical plan is to succeed:

• Withdrawals are not a new business in Israel. The Jewish State pulled out of about 85 percent of the land it gained in the 1967 war, uprooting some 35 settlements and displacing about 45,000 of its citizens, in line with peace accords with Jordan and Egypt.  Three times in the last decade, in direct talks with Palestinian leadership, Israel offered or acquiesced to significant withdrawals along the lines the latest reports suggest – in 2000, 2001 and 2008. It withdrew unilaterally from Gaza and a part of the West Bank in 2005. A further withdrawal was the central platform of the victorious Kadima party in the 2006 elections. (On that platform Kadima gained a plurality of votes in the 2009 elections, although it did not form the government.) Each time, the Palestinians walked away.  Shockingly, in terms of real estate, the last decade of misery has been about perhaps 5 percent of the West Bank. Israelis therefore wonder if there is reason to believe that borders, as such, are what the Palestinian leadership is ultimately after.
• With this in mind, Israelis find it curious that the leaks of the recent White House discussion included no mention that an agreement must mean the “end of conflict.” Perhaps it goes without saying, but “end of conflict” must be stated in any discussion of a peace settlement. Palestinian failure to recognize the fundamental justice of Israel as an expression of the right of Jews to a state will be a stumbling-block to peace, particularly in light of the requirement that Palestinians give up their claim to open immigration into Israel (“right of return”). Without an “end of conflict” guarantee, there will likely be many Palestinians who consider themselves entitled to settle within Israel, and who will remain susceptible to radical incitement. Without a Palestinian (and broader Arab) retreat from delegitimization of Zionism, how can Israelis assume that withdrawal to something approximating the pre-1967 ceasefire lines will bring a stable peace? Is it not just as likely to return the conflict to its pre-1967 condition: ongoing attempts to attack and undermine Israel within those lines?
• Accounts of the latest Obama administration thinking about Jerusalem—much in the news these days, in the ongoing fallout from the ill-timed housing announcement during Vice President Biden’s March visit to Israel—focus on dividing the city, with the Palestinian part and the Israeli part serving as capitals of two countries. The concept is not new; proposals to “share” Greater Jerusalem in some fashion have been standard fare in various final-status models for years. But it is without a working precedent anywhere. Can a divided Jerusalem work for its inhabitants as a city and for the two countries as an anchor to peace, rather than a trigger for renewed agitation?
• Would Israel’s pre-1967 borders be defensible should the need arise, even with NATO or U.S. troops sitting on the Jordan River, as reports suggest the White House would favor?  After all, it is not that these 1949 ceasefire lines “could” lead to war, they already have—in 1967, when Jordanian forces opened fire on Israel, seeking to take advantage of its indefensible lines to exploit what were mistakenly believed to be Egyptian victories in Sinai.  And let us not forget Israel’s disappointing experiences with international forces in Sinai in 1967, the Golan in 1973, or even Lebanon currently.
• How safe will Palestinians feel? Palestine will be a tiny country without frontiers anchored on natural and geographically logical borders. Where will it turn for security assistance? Given its leadership’s traditional view of Israel as an illegitimate security threat, would alignment with Syria, Hizbullah and Iran seem unlikely or undesirable? Clearly, this would be an unacceptable outcome for the Administration’s planners—as well as for many Arab moderates. And it would be intolerable for Israel. But how could it be prevented?
• In pursuing an agreement, will the compromises required of the Palestinians (there will have to be some—in addition to compromises Israel is prepared to make) lead to greater stability or heightened tension in an increasingly volatile and polarized region? To state the obvious, the Middle East has a life outside the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, much of it troubled. Nothing in the resolution of that conflict will heal Sunni-Shiite tensions or ethnic relations in Lebanon or centuries-old Persian ambitions in the Persian/Arab Gulf.  Nor will it bring democracy to Syria, Sudan or Saudi Arabia, correct the appalling status of women, counter discrimination against religious minorities, or end pervasive corruption. Any U.S.-formulated proposals, with all their potential uncertainties, will have to be thought through in terms of their real-world consequences.

The Israelis with whom I’ve spoken recently are not ideological opponents of territorial withdrawal; they applaud their government’s support for a two-state solution. But they worry about safety and security. Like the great majority of Israelis over the last generation, they will examine any U.S. proposals first and foremost in those terms. The Administration will be most successful if it convincingly addresses them. 

first published at http://bit.ly/1lRKHXf