Fire on the Mountain

It apparently began when a mischievous fourteen-year-old playing hooky from school ran off to an isolated spot near his town on the Carmel mountainside in order to smoke a nargilah (water pipe). Tragically, he seems to have been careless in disposing of the hot coal from the pipe. One’s heart goes out to him: this Tom Sawyeresque escapade, so innocent in its adolescent mischief-making, generated the worst forest fire in Israel’s history. By the time it was extinguished 42 people were dead, over 17,000 had been evacuated from their homes, and 40,000 dunams (about 9,900 acres) of forest were destroyed, including perhaps as many as four million trees. 

Israel’s firefighting services exhibited enormous dedication and courage in battling the blaze, but paid the price for decades of neglect by the authorities that is symptomatic of serious underlying governmental dysfunctions. Before turning to that aspect, however, it is important to note what went right:

• Faced with an unprecedented crisis on a scale unforeseen, and without proper equipment, all levels of the fire-fighting and security community exercised initiative, courage and creativity in some ways reminiscent of the Israeli response to the strategic surprise gained by the Egyptian and Syrian armies in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The Israeli talent for improvisation, improvement, and reconceptualization under pressure were all on display. This was as true on the level of the individual firefighter as it was on the level of senior government officials, who broke with tradition and met an unprecedented crisis with an unprecedented call for foreign assistance.
• Israeli social solidarity remained strong in the face of crisis. None of the displaced persons was left without food and shelter. Israeli social values ensured that the security forces had more volunteer assistance than they were capable of absorbing. Thus most of the fatalities were prison-service officer cadets rushing to evacuate the Damoun prison that houses security prisoners, among others.
• The Israeli government’s Emergency Administration fulfilled its charge with distinction, coordinating government agencies with civil-society groups to great effect. In terms of Israel’s ability to withstand future attacks on its home front, this was a test of enormous significance.
• Faced with this terrible crisis, Israelis discovered they are not alone. Greece and Cyprus were here with firefighting airplanes and materiel. The Americans, numerous European nations, Russia, and even Turkey stepped up to the plate-24 nations in all! This could not but impress an Israeli population that, with very good reason, takes a cautious view of the international community.

On the other hand, the dysfunctional aspects of Israeli governance revealed in this emergency cry out for correction. According to the Ministry of the Interior’s own research, Israel has the worst equipped, most short-handed firefighting force among all members of the OECD, which it recently joined. This is all the more astonishing when we consider that the threats to the home front touted openly by Hizbullah and Hamas clearly require modern, efficient firefighting forces. Firefighters paid with their lives because the Israeli bureaucracy tends to let critical functions spin in the wind if they do not have strong constituencies. Unlike the police, Israel’s firefighters are municipal employees. In this country that is just the size of New Jersey and with only seven-and-a-half million citizens, there is no unified firefighting command structure and only the most threadbare national organization of firefighting forces. 

In a colossal display of kicking the can down the lane, it was revealed during the fire that Israel’s air force had withdrawn its helicopters from their firefighting role several years ago because the weight of the huge “buckets” of water was warping the frames of the aircraft. So far as can be ascertained, this was an appropriate decision in that the helicopters in question were not designed for this purpose. However, having withdrawn the means of fighting forest fires from the air, the air force neither replaced nor developed any replacement. No other organ of government stepped up to the plate, including the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for firefighting. Minister of the Interior Eli Yishai has so far resisted calls for his resignation. Minister of Defense Barak has also come under severe criticism. Israel has a weak tradition of personal ministerial responsibility for obvious malfunctions in their ministries, and we shall see how this plays out. 

In the meantime, Israel is catching its breath, treating its wounds, burying its dead and, hopefully, learning its lessons.

First published at http://bit.ly/1yDLoI1