Israeli Politics: Reshaping the Top of the Pyramid

Over the last two months Israel has experienced a subtle reshaping of the top of the governmental pyramid, the offices of the prime minister, defense minister, and foreign minister. In a situation where threats to the state’s continued existence have overwhelmed most other political questions for generations, these three posts have constituted the centers of power. Within this triangle, the Prime Minister’s Office has been first among equals, with the Defense Ministry-guarantor of Israel’s security and the entity through which so many Israelis served their country-enjoying a relative advantage over the Foreign Ministry.

In the current coalition, the Labor-led Defense Ministry also lent a right-of-center government additional international credibility as it sought to convince a skeptical world that its remarkable and unreciprocated concessions to the Palestinians were honest. The struggle to keep Labor in the government was a gruesome political melee that, in the end, led to a split in that once-mighty party.

first published at http://bit.ly/1ptFnHw

There also appears to be a personal factor. While both Defense Minister Barak and Foreign Minister Lieberman have long acquaintanceships with Netanyahu (Barak was his commander during their army days and Lieberman his director-general in his first term as prime minister), Netanyahu has appeared to prefer to consult with the former. Perhaps this is due to matters of temperament and experience. While Netanyahu and Barak have lifetimes of experience in their ministries’ areas of responsibility, Lieberman is without previous diplomatic training or experience. Furthermore, given Lieberman’s strong personality, his bent for bluntness and his unconventional views, few are surprised at the difficulties he has encountered in managing the nation’s diplomacy.

Whatever the three-way relationship was through the end of 2010, the ground shifted on January 17, 2011, when, in a surprise move, Barak and a number of supporters announced they were leaving Labor to create a new party, to be called “Independence.” This led to the exit of the Labor ministers from the government and the reduction of the coalition from 74 to 66 MKs in the 120-member body.

Thus weakened, Barak suffered a further stumble in his apparent mishandling of the replacement of the outgoing IDF Chief of Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi. Barak’s first choice, Yoav Galant, failed to pass public scrutiny when he was found to have signed a false affidavit in a matter related to a private real estate dispute. Evidently believing that Ashkenazi was behind some of the public critique of Galant, Barak gave a scathing media interview in which he hurled extraordinary allegations of ethically inappropriate behavior and professional incompetence at the still-sitting chief of staff.

Unsurprisingly, this behavior backfired badly. In media-run polls, the public showed a deep appreciation for Ashkenazi’s tenure as Israel’s top soldier and refused Barak’s suggestion to “trust me” on the matter. Even the successful appointment of Benny Gantz to replace Ashkenazi did not bolster Barak’s declining poll numbers. If current electoral projections hold, Barak’s Independence party could well disappear in the next election.

As Barak’s political position weakened, Liberman’s correspondingly grew. With his party’s 15 Knesset seats, Lieberman probably has enough parliamentary clout to decide the date of the next election. Many of his provocative actions – speaking at the UN against his own government’s policies, vigorously promoting controversial legislation on conversion, undermining Netanyahu’s appointment of retiring National Security Council chief Uzi Arad as ambassador to London, and more – are widely seen as attempts to create a public perception of Netanyahu as a weak leader. If Netanyahu becomes an unattractive candidate and Lieberman succeeds in outflanking the Likud from the Right, he seems to believe that his party, Yisrael Beitenu, can replace the Likud as the largest party on the Right and that he will be the next prime minister, all within one electoral cycle. While this scenario is not at all certain, it is hardly far-fetched: Kadima, offering a Centrist alternative, did the very same thing to Labor on the Left. Meanwhile, Netanyahu is responding to this challenge with careful restraint, apparently calculating that the longer Lieberman remains a linchpin of the current government, the less credible will be his attacks on its policies once the election campaign begins in earnest.

Another wrinkle in the story: The Attorney General’s office is now in the final stages of an investigation into allegations of financial misdeeds on the part of the foreign minister. If law enforcement officials decide to indict, Lieberman will be forced to resign his ministerial position, though possibly not his role as charismatic leader of Yisrael Beitenu.

The most stable component of the coalition seems to Prime Minister Netanyahu himself. As his two strongest coalition partners face potentially career-ending challenges, the test Netanyahu faces is to strengthen his hold on the coalition, giving him the time and the clout to determine the still unclear legacy his second government will leave behind….